Since the global financial crisis long-term interest rates on government bonds have been low in major advanced countries. In the United States, however, the Federal Open Market Committee (FOMC), the Federal Reserve's interest rate setting body, could begin to hike the fed funds target rate before the end of this year. The Bank of England may also begin to raise interest rates early next year if the UK economy improves.
There is little reason to believe that low interest rates and quantitative easing have been supportive of growth. Central banks' large-scale asset purchase programs and various emergency measures may have been necessary to ensure that payment and financial systems stayed intact.
These programs have supported financial asset prices and have spurred higher net worth of households, particularly high income households. Higher asset prices were expected to induce stronger consumer spending from the wealth effect; in reality they have done little to promote economic growth, real fixed investment, jobs, or wage increases. Even in countries such as the US and Japan, where unemployment rates have declined, it is unclear whether protracted low interest rates have been helpful.
What is the outlook for global long-term interest rates? Will interest rates remain low in the coming six months? What are the risks around interest rates? What can policymakers do to cure the malady of low interest rates? This article will address these questions.
It will be argued that despite the Fed's forthcoming tightening of monetary policy, long-term interest rates in advanced countries are likely to stay low for the remainder of 2015 and the first half of 2016. Policy rates in the advanced economies will stay low, which will keep short-term interest rates low. Inflationary pressures are likely to be muted due to low energy and commodity prices and feeble nominal wage growth. The balance sheets of the major central banks will stay bloated; some will continue large-scale asset purchases while others will try to maintain the size of their balance sheets by reinvesting principal payments for a period even after their first rate hike. Growth in global industrial production and international trade has been disappointing in recent months, particularly in key emerging markets. Global economic activity is likely to remain soft in coming months as effective demand in most economies is tame, while the demand 3 for safe assets will be strong. The combination of these factors with the recent turbulence in global financial markets will keep long-term interest rates in the major advanced countries low.
The cure to the malady of low long-term interest rates lies in proactive fiscal policy and enterprising measures to support job growth. Active fiscal policies and public efforts to promote job growth could boost effective demand and lift wage growth and real disposable income. These in turn could raise inflation and long-term interest rates.
LOW LONG-TERM INTEREST RATES: HERE, THERE AND ALMOST

EVERYWHERE
Long-term interest rates are low in almost every major advanced country (figure 1). In the US, long-term interest rates began to decline with the onset of the global financial crisis as the FOMC cut the fed funds target rate, its main policy rate. The Fed fund rate has remained unchanged since late 2008. Meanwhile, long-term interest rates in the US remain at low levels compared to their history (Akram 2015a) .
Figure 1. Long-Term Interest Rates among the Developed Economies Stand at 15-Year Lows
Similarly, long-term interest rates in the UK fell notably in 2008 as the Bank of England (BoE) cuts its base rate several times. The BoE has kept its base rate unchanged since early 2009. As a result, long-term interest rates have remained consistently low.
In Japan long-term interest rates were already quite low before the crisis as the economy had been stagnant for decades (Akram 2014) . Still, interest rates fell further following the crisis, as the Bank of Japan (BoJ) reduced its overnight call rate in late 2008. Since then the BoJ kept its policy rate unchanged. Long-term interest rates in Japan have remained very low despite the country's elevated government debt ratio Das 2014a, 2014b) . Long-term interest rates generally have declined further since the advent of the "Abenomics" and the BoJ's quantitative and qualitative monetary easing.
In the euro zone, long-term interest rates fell as the European Central Bank (ECB) began to cut its refinancing rate in late 2008. Interest rates rose in 2011 when the ECB raised the refinancing rate. In euro zone peripheral countries such as Portugal, Italy, Ireland, Greece, and Spain, longterm interest rates spiked and remained high until late 2012. Investors were concerned about high government-debt-to-GDP ratios, large fiscal deficits, default, and political risks, including the possibility of exit from the euro zone (Akram 2015b) . These concerns did not fade until the ECB made clear that it was committed to providing liquidity to the financial system, keeping yields contained on euro zone government bonds, taking appropriate measures to ensure the stability of the financial system, and keeping the common currency. Since mid-2013 interest rates have declined markedly for most euro zone countries, including Italy and Spain; by contrast, not for Greece as investors remain concerned about the country's debt sustainability and possible exit from the euro zone. Meanwhile, the ECB has reduced its deposit rate below zero. This has resulted in low or even negative nominal bond yields in a number of euro zone countries, including Belgium, Germany, Finland, France, Austria, and the Netherlands, as well as other European countries outside the euro zone, such as Switzerland and Norway (figure 2). Recent trends in Fed fund futures and other interest rate markets suggest that investors are pricing in Fed hikes but are uncertain about the timing of the first hike, the pace of tightening, and the "terminal" fed funds rate. Investors are jittery and appear to be weighting unfavorable news more than favorable news. Likewise in the UK, investors expect the BoE to begin easing as reflected by the implied bank rate conditioning path. In recent years, however, expectations of BoE rate hikes have often stayed unrealized as the UK economy has proven weaker than investors believed. 
DRIVERS OF LONG-TERM INTEREST RATES
According to standard theory, interest rates generally should be positive because of positive time preference as argued in Fisher (1930) and Olson and Bailey (1981) , as cited in Edwards (1991) .
von Mises (1963) , also cited in Edwards (1991) , noted that "satisfaction of a want in the nearer future is, other things being equal, preferred to that in the further distant future. Present goods are more valuable than future goods." Indeed, for most of bond market history, nominal yields on government bonds have been positive.
Keynes did not accept the classical view of interest rates. He held that the ultimate basis of interest rates lies in human psychology, social convention, and liquidity preference. Though he did not conceive or foresee that nominal interest rates would be negative, Keynes's (1930 Keynes's ( , 2007 Keynes's ( [1936 ) astute observation still holds that the central bank sets risk-free, short-term interest rates on Treasury bills, which in turn influence the yield curve on government bonds. Keynes argued that the investor takes his cue about long-term interest rates from current conditions and the nearterm outlook. As a result, short-term interest rates and changes in short-term interest rates are respectively the crucial determinants of long-term interest rates and the changes in long-term rates. The post-crisis experience of persistently low long-term interest rates in the major advanced economies with monetary sovereignty, despite tremendous increases in the balance sheets of key central banks, accords with Keynes's conjectures about the determinants of longterm interest rates.
Since World War II, the main drivers of long-term interest rates in advanced economies have been short-term interest rates, inflation, inflation expectations, and economic activity. The level of economic activity influences inflation and inflation expectations. The central bank's policy rates, which influence short-term interest rates, are set in response to observed inflation, expected inflation, and effective demand. Generally, short-term interest rates move in tandem with the central bank's policy rates (figure 3). Short-term rates and long-term rates usually move hand in hand. Scatterplots show that these rates are strongly correlated (figure 4). What's more, percentage point changes in long-and short-term interest rates are also positively correlated, though less so than the strong correlation between the levels of long-term and short-term interest rates (figure 5). The nominal yields of government bonds also tend to move in tandem with core inflation (figure 6). 
NEGATIVE BOND YIELDS IN EUROPE
Until recently it was widely held that zero would set the lower bound for interest rates. As the Swiss National Bank, Sweden's Riksbank, and the ECB introduced negative deposit rates, however, yields to maturity on money market instruments including Treasury bills turned negative; yields on government bonds of longer tenors for several euro zone and other European countries later followed suit.
Since household and firms can hold cash (notes) instead of government securities it would seem that they would not accept negative rates. But there are costs to holding cash including storage costs, inconvenience, and insurance. Custom, caution, and behavioral conservatism may make households, banks, and financial institutions willing to accept negative rates. What's more, if investors expect deflation, then even if nominal yields are negative expected real yields could be positive. For example, if the nominal yield on a government bond of one year is -1%, but investors expect deflation at a rate of 2% for the year ahead, then the expected real yield from holding a one-year bond would be -1%-(-2%) = +1%. Even if the expected real yield is not positive, investors might be willing to accept negative nominal yields in an economic environment of heightened uncertainty, debt deflation, deflationary expectations, and increased volatility.
LOW INFLATION AND SUBDUED INFLATIONARY EXPECTATIONS
Current inflationary pressures, as reflected in actual inflation and various metrics of inflationary expectations, are subdued and contained. Global import prices have been declining (figure 9).
Energy prices are low and have been declining. Core inflation rates are weak in almost all major advanced countries. Core inflation rates are notably below 2% in many advanced economies (figure 10). In the United States, nominal wage growth is still subdued. Low employment cost index (ECI) and low unit labor costs (ULC) keeps core inflation in check (figure 11). The containment of labor costs has been keeping inflationary pressures in check in advanced economies. It is true that the US labor market has tightened, as reflected in the decline of the official unemployment rate and broader measures, such the U-6 unemployment rate. Yet wage growth has been moderate because of the weakness in workers' bargaining power, deunionization, the growth of the service sector, globalization of production, outsourcing, changes in the workplace, and a sociopolitical climate that is adverse to workers. 
Figure 15. The Evolution of the BoJ's Balance Sheet
The balance sheets of the major central banks are likely to remain elevated as these central banks are either continuing to expand their asset purchases or reinvesting principal payments. Fed policymakers have stated they would wait until well after they begin to hike the fed funds target rate to begin a gradual shrinking of the central bank's balance sheet.
MUTED GLOBAL ACTIVITY
Growth in economic activity, as measured by industrial production, is muted world-wide ( figure   16 ). Industrial production is a good indicator of cyclical global business conditions even though services constitute the bulk of economic activity, particularly in advanced countries. Industrial production is more cyclically sensitive than activity in services and tends to lead the fluctuation of overall economic activity. Growth in global industrial production today is slowing compared to a year ago. For advanced countries year-over-year industrial production growth is negligible, while for the emerging market it is softening. Since the beginning of 2008, levels of industrial production have not risen much in advanced countries. US industrial production is slightly above its 2008 level, whereas for Germany it is slightly below. For Japan it is significantly lower.
Industrial production is notably weak in Latin America, central and eastern Europe, and the euro zone. It is still rising year-over-year in Asia excluding Japan but at a slower pace than in the recent past.
Figure 16. Global Industrial Production Is Soft, with Negligible Growth in Advanced Economies and Slowing in Emerging Markets
Key emerging markets are experiencing slowdown. Industrial production is tumbling in Brazil and Russia; it has markedly slowed in China while continuing to grow in India (figure 17), though India's contribution to global industrial production is still quite small. Global trade has slowed, reflecting the slowdown of industrial production. The volumes of Asian exports and imports have been weakening since the beginning of the year. Intra-Asian trade is a substantial and useful measure of global production and trade. A strong dollar and muted economic growth in the rest of the world has hurt US exports, but US imports are rising, having benefited from dollar strength and the moderate pace of US growth.
Figure 17. BRICs Industrial Production Disappoints with the Exception of India THE RESILIENT DEMAND FOR SAFE ASSETS
The demand for safe assets, such as government bonds, is strong. Investors continue to pour money into government bonds of major advanced countries, particularly US Treasury securities. 
THE BALANCE OF ECONOMIC RISKS
The balance of risks for the global economy is tilted to the downside. This means that long-term interest rates could stay low longer than currently expected, and perhaps even decline, if the global economy were to unravel. Weakness in the US and further slowdown in China could pose serious problems for the global economy. Another downside risk is that the tepid recovery in the euro zone could quickly erode. On the upside, if wages begin to rise as the US labor market tightens, the Fed might be compelled to become more aggressive in tightening monetary policy in order to curb inflationary pressure. The BoE might follow suit if the UK economy continues to improve. Better economic performance and higher inflationary pressures in the US and the UK could force interest rates higher than anticipated in early 2016. This analyst, however, gives more weight to downside risks than to upside risks for the global economy.
THE CURE TO THE MALADY OF LOW INTEREST RATES
Low interest rates in the major advanced economies are really symptoms of the ills that afflict the global economy: low economic growth and core inflation rates below targets. Overcoming low global growth and associated low long-term interest rates will require policies to boost economic activity; accommodative monetary policy has not been enough.
The euro zone and countries such as the UK and Canada have tried fiscal austerity. The euro zone periphery is suffering from years of austerity that proved to be counterproductive (Akram 2015b ). In the euro zone, unemployment rates are elevated, while the ratios of periphery countries' debt to GDP have stayed high. Policymakers will need to shun fiscal austerity if they want to overcome the current malaise of low growth.
There are feasible alternatives to austerity. Fiscal policy will have to be reoriented to support job and wage growth, to build twenty-first-century infrastructure, to cope with global warming and environment challenges, and to support healthcare and demographic transitions in advanced countries.
The first priority of advanced countries should be programs to create jobs. Job creation should not be left solely to the private sector, but should involve the public sector and public-private partnerships. Public policy has to take an active role in job creation. There is still considerable unemployment, underemployment, and underutilization of labor in many advanced economies, even though official unemployment rates may seem quite low. The public sector can directly hire workers (Forstater 1998) . Public-sector job creation can help stabilize wages and prices (Mitchell 1998) . It can also support skill acquisition in the labor force, maintain human capital, serve public good, and accomplish socially useful objectives. It can be a useful instrument for macroeconomic stability. The challenge will to be design and efficiently administer and manage large-scale employment programs and to envision this as a viable countercyclical and pro-growth strategy. Well-designed and properly managed large-scale employment programs could boost effective demand and lift real wages and real disposable incomes.
Prolonged periods of low interest rates can be counterproductive, particularly if fiscal policy is restrictive and public policy fails to generate employment growth and support appropriate public and private investment. Sakuma (2015) points out that as the spreads between short-term interest 22 rates and long-term interest rates narrow, commercial banks can become conservative in lending.
This hampers businesses' fixed investment in equipment, structures, and intellectual property products and growth in overall economic activity. Low interest rates could lead to a vicious cycle of low inflation and deflation amid weak effective demand. Debt deflation amplifies the weakness of effective demand (Fisher 1933) . Overcoming the malaise of low interest rates and deflationary trends will require concerted action on the part of fiscal authorities and the central bank. Samuelson (1945) , cited in Kregel (2015) , argues that higher interest rates could be beneficial to the banking system and would not necessarily be detrimental to fixed-income investors or to the growth of effective demand. In the midst of spare capacity, a moderate rise in interest rates can provide more interest income and spur household spending. The evidence that low interest rates promote investment and consumer spending is not too compelling. Despite low interest rates, in the current global environment the weakness of effective demand is keeping growth and investment feeble.
CONCLUSION
Long-term interest rates in major advanced countries will stay low for the remainder of 2015 and in early 2016 because of the combination of domestic and global factors that have kept global interest rates low for many years-even if the Fed begins to hike and the Bank of England follows suit. Domestic conditions, such as central banks' low policy rates, low short-term interest rates, subdued inflation and inflationary expectations, and weak effective demand are the main drivers of low long-term interest rates. Global conditions are reinforcing these drivers. Global inflation is low due to weak energy and commodity prices, declining prices of imported goods, and a strong US dollar. It will take bold, imaginative, and proactive fiscal policy and large-scale employment programs to rekindle economic prosperity and cure the malady of low global interest rates.
